European Bulletin of Social Psychology

Editorial

Welcome to the Millennial issue of the Bulletin. The main aim of the Bulletin remains that of being informative and interesting to members of the Association. Reflect the dawning of a new age (well at least some of us feel older), we have reshaped, reformatted and reconstituted the Bulletin so that it can be easily stored and referred to alongside all the other journals that are overfilling your shelves. You may notice that the Bulletin is the same size as the ProFile and the Membership list, but has a different coloured spine and cover. All three depict the new logo for the Association, which was designed by our postgraduate member Delphine Beaudoin.

The new Bulletin has an ISSN number. Our intention is that articles and reviews published in the Bulletin can be referred to just as any other journal article. If you think your library would like to subscribe to the Bulletin please let us know. At present we have not set a library subscription rate, but this is something that we might wish to do soon, if members seem supportive of the idea. We aim to sustain a high standard but also to publish material relatively quickly. Editorial judgements are made by me with the help of members of the Executive committee. Some contributions are invited but we also welcome suggestions. If you'd like to write an article for the Bulletin please feel free to discuss it with any member of the Executive committee and/or me. Inside the back cover we have provided guidelines for contributors. Adherence to these guidelines will help us to ensure a smooth and easy transition from manuscript to printed article. Many thanks to Sibylle Classen for managing the change over to the new format, setting up the new ISSN number and overseeing the production process.

This issue also sees the introduction of book reviews. In general we shall seek reviews for major books by members of the Association, but also we will sometimes invite reviews of books by non-members, and perhaps a round up review of European-orientated text books at some stage. It would be nice to be able to publish reviews in the same year as a book is published so we are keeping the reviews relatively short (300-500 words)

and informative. Some monographs might prove particularly controversial or require a lengthier analysis, and so for these we might publish longer review articles of 1000-1500 words. If you are about to have a book published, or alternatively would like to offer to review a particular book, please let me know. We hope the book review section will be successful and useful for members of the Association. Guidelines for preparing a review are available from Sibylle Classen and on our web page, (www.eaesp.org)which will be available from the beginning of February.

Conscious of the global scale of scientific work, and the need to cooperate to promote social psychology at an international level, the Executive committee has been involved in discussions with the Society for Experimental Social Psychology (SESP), the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP). We are pleased to announce that we have agreed to try out some collaborative activities with SPSSI and SPSP, in the form of small meetings and international teaching fellowships, respectively. We have also made some proposals for collaborative support for graduate student exchanges with SESP and these are still under consideration by SESP. We hope to develop closer international links with other social psychology organisations in the future.

The fourth development is the new EAESP web site. This will contain general information, announcements, details of application procedures for membership, for grants and for meetings, information about new members, recent address changes and links to other sites. We do not plan to run a list server but it may be possible to post information on the web. Again we thank Sibylle for her work in preparing the web site.

Well that is enough editorialising. I hope you find plenty of interesting and readable material in this issue of the Bulletin. Thanks to the many contributors, and happy new year!

Dominic Abrams

Article

Moving from Fads and Fashions to Integration:
Illustrations from knowledge accessibility research

by Diederik A. Stapel

Jos Jaspars Lecture, Oxford Playhouse, July 15, 1999[1]

Thank you very much. I am honored to be here.

I would like to thank the organisation of the conference and the award committee for giving me the opportunity to talk about my work here. I am especially honored to do this in honor of the late Jos Jaspars, who was not only an esteemed professor here at Oxford, but also a fellow countryman. Perhaps that is the reason why I am, after Naomi Ellemers and after Carsten De DeDreu, the third Dutch person chosen to give the Jos Jaspars lecture. Let's just hope that this "Dutch hat trick" will not stop the next jury to give the award again to someone from my home country. And maybe you did not know this, but Neil Macrae was also born in The Netherlands.

I am happy you all decided to come and listen at this late hour. I know that most of you have been listening to talks, have been dazzled with all kinds of hypotheses, data, interpretations, and explanations since 8.30 (!!) this morning. I am really happy that you chose to postpone the consumption of a glass of beer (or wine) for yet one more hour. Because of the late hour of this presentation, I decided not to bombard you with tons and tons of studies and empirical data. I will present some experiments, but a large part of what follows will be argumentations and anecdotes.

Moreover, the point I will try to make is in principle familiar to all of you. Hopefully, that makes it easier to listen (and sometimes doze off).

Normally, I do not read my talks. Normally, I talk my talks. But now I am a little too nervous. (….). I will at least read parts of my talk. Hopefully, you can live with that. If not, I would like to remind you of the fact that this is the Jos Jaspars *lecture*. Not the Jos Jaspars *talk*. And if my Latin serves me right, this means that there must be something to <u>read</u>. Thus, I would like to say: "Lectoribus Salutem." Hello Lecture-receivers.

It is sometimes hard to explain how we social psychologists do things. What is it what we do and why are we doing it that way? A few weeks before I left Amsterdam to come to the U.K., a friend of mine asked me where I was going. This friend is a doctor practicing internal medicine at the hospital of the University of Amsterdam. He is in the business of saving people's lives on a daily basis. This gives him an advantage.
"So, where are you going?" he asked me.
"I am going to Oxford, to a conference on social psychology. I won a prize."
"Wooow! That's great. Congratulations. What did you win? How much?"
"Well, the answer is that the award is that I am asked to give a talk, a lecture actually, for a large audience of experts in my field."
My friend fell silent. He looked at me, amazed. Dazed and confused.
"I never understood why you, you of all people, decided to become a social psychologist. What is social psychology, anyway?"

This little conversation made me think. What is it what we, social psychologists, do? What are the methods and practices of our science? Today, I hope to address these questions in the context of some well-known social psychological phenomena and especially in relation to research on context effects on social cognition, judgment, and behavior. The first part of this lecture will consist of some personal, <u>non-normative</u> ruminations about the science of social psychology. In the second part, I hope to illustrate these ruminations with some empirical data.

What is it what we do when we do social psychology? Or, more specifically: What is it what we do when we do <u>experimental</u> social

psychology⸮ There are of course several answers to this question, but one goes something like this: First there is an observation of an interesting social phenomenon that seems to be in need of an explanation. This could be anything. For example, a colleague of mine is an excellent chess player. Not so long ago he played Kasparov and won. No, I am not kidding. When this colleague and I play chess, I never win. But sometimes I feel good just playing with him, whereas at other times I feel horrible that he is so much better than I am. Sometimes I feel elated, sometimes I feel frustrated. It is observations like this that fuel the social psychological engine and become the start of a research program. Why is it that superior others sometimes have beneficial and sometimes detrimental effects on self-perception⸮

We sit down in our arm-chairs, look out of the window, doodle some boxes and arrows on a piece of paper, we think and think and ruminate and …. we come up with a possible answer, a hypothesis. This hypothesis becomes the starting point of our experimental work. This hypothesis is our mission statement. We think that A leads to X because of , B, C, and D and we set out to test this idea. We design an experiment and go to our lab to test our conjectures. And then what happens⸮ Our experiment fails. We don't find what we expected to find. Moreover, we find something we cannot explain. We tweak and fine-tune the experimental set-up until we find something we do comprehend, something that works, something with a P-value smaller than .05. Champaign! Celebration! We replicate our experiment. We test alternative explanations. We present our data at international conferences, we write papers, and we say profound things about human nature. What started with a personal observation about the relation between two chess-playing colleagues now becomes a theory of "self-maintenance" or "social comparison" or "social influence."

I am sure that there are other ways of doing experimental social psychology. Sometimes, for example, our research is theory- rather than data- or observation-driven. My point is that whatever way we arrive at our theories and hypotheses, the experiments and tests we design are made to *verify*, not to *falsify* our conjectures. The leeway, the freedom we have in the design of our experiments is so enormous that when an experiment does not give us what we are looking for, we blame the experiment, not our theory. (At least, that is the way I work). Is this problematic⸮ No.

Our results are often **paradigm-contingent**. That is, we find what we are looking for because we design our experiments in such a way that we are likely to find what we are looking for. Of course! Should we design our experiments such that we are unlikely to find support for our hypotheses? Should we try to prove ourselves wrong? No, for the best results, we should use the methods that are likely to work best. Use a spoon to eat your soup and a cup to drink your tea. Not vice versa.

Most of us do eat our soup with a spoon. Most of us do drink our tea from a cup. We know what tools to use for what types of questions. We know how to design our studies to obtain the effects we are looking for. What we find in our elegant and aesthetically pleasing 2 x 2 experiments is found using a very specific set of stimuli and materials. Our procedures, materials, and measures have often been chosen with great care. Perhaps Lewin and Festinger ate the fruits of their social psychological inquiries with their bare hands. Today, experimental social psychology is more like an exquisite meal that is served in a very expensive restaurant: We use a new, specific utensil to dissect every single course.

Social psychology has become more precise and more specific in its tests of theories. Because of this, researchers have stayed more and more within the narrow confines of the experimental paradigms within which the target phenomenon was initially demonstrated. In fact, several research programs seem to have grown up around very specific stimulus materials and procedures. There is the "weak arguments/strong arguments" paradigm in persuasion, the "Donald" paradigm in person perception, the "minimal group" paradigm in group perception, and the "memory, recall, and response times" paradigm in stereotyping research. Is this problematic? No.

By definition, our theories and our hypotheses are broader and less specific than our methods and procedures. It is logical and even necessary that the theories that instigate and ignite our empirical investigations and the conclusions and implications that follow them are more general and imperialistic in their claims than the actual empirical tests on which they are based. But sometimes, however, we are too imperialistic, too quick with our brush stroke statements. Is this problematic? Well, yes.
I think we need to be aware of the restricted nature of our research

paradigms. This doesn't mean that we should abandon them. But we should try to look at them from a distance, with an uninvolved, open-mind. Most scientists are <u>not</u> aware of the ways in which their research designs are restricted. Therefore we are often unable to make appropriate allowance for the possibility that other research perspectives may come to different conclusions than we do. Hence, we all have a tendency to be overly optimistic about the generalisability of our research findings. We are **imperialistic optimists**.

What then <u>determines</u> which scientific perspective will be used in the design of an experiment or in the interpretation of data? Fashion. Fashion? Well, perhaps. The fact is that not all research paradigms are created equal. Some ways of doing research are more fashionable than others. Some paradigms are more popular than others. Not only because they work better, but also because they are more in line with the trend of the day, with the questions and issues people are interested in at that particular moment in time. To further the analogy to fashion. Social psychology is a **catwalk of ideas**. Those ideas that get the best reviews in important magazines will be made "ready-to-wear" and are most likely to become the standards of the industry, worn on a daily basis by many of us. At least, for a period of time. What is hot now, was not so hot then. What was hot then, is not so hot now.

A potential disadvantage of the faddish nature of scientific inquiry is that scientific trends manifest themselves by suggesting that some <u>questions</u> are more interesting than others. Thus, in today's social psychology, that is social psychology of the late 90s, social cognition reigns and rules. A question like "How do people process unexpected information?" is now thought to be more interesting than a question like "How do people learn social norms and values?" This is what is called the **"hot-stuff" bias**.

It is important to note that this "hot-stuff bias" does not necessarily mean that articles which do not address the questions that are in vogue are less likely to get published. Obviously, there is no reason to believe that there is an editorial conspiracy to keep articles that pose "non-trendy" questions out of the mainstream journals. However, "what's hot and what's not" may determine which published articles get most attention from readers and other writers. Scientific trends influence the body of knowledge that

is thought to exist in a particular domain of scientific inquiry. As Michael Billig once wrote, "there is a danger in psychology that theorists get so preoccupied with one sort human activity that they produce one-sided theories, which overlook the contrary aspects of human endeavors."

What does this mean? Does it mean we should become less enthusiastic about our research endeavors? Does it mean we should all try to come up with multi-sided theories? Should we always try to be multi-focussed and integrative in our theories and hypotheses? Do we need to be fashionable and unfashionable at the same time? Should we all be integrators instead of innovators?

No. I don't think so. Specificity is good, provincialism should be applauded. Kurt Lewin is known for having said "that there is nothing so practical as a good theory." But Leon Festinger once noted that we should never forget that "all theories are wrong." All theories are lies. That is, all theories are only approximations of the empirical domain they are trying to describe and explain.

It is good when theories or general perspectives are faddish and trendy. This increases the likelihood that a perspective will be tested and developed to its extreme. The more precise the assumptions of a theory and its implications are specified, the more likely it is that rigorous tests of the theory will require the development of a restricted research paradigm within which theory-relevant variables can be manipulated and their effects on specific responses can be measured.

But again, I like to stress that there is a danger that the paradigm developed for such purposes *creates* the phenomena that are observed rather than capturing more general phenomena that exist outside the conditions in which the theory is applied. How then, do we decide between wallowing in a certain perspective, following it to its extreme and abandoning it for another model?

Ideally, we should approach the way we do research with an open but persistent mind. A researcher should learn any one paradigm thoroughly and master it so that she can use it intensively and creatively. At the same time she should not think of it in such exclusive terms that the paradigm

blinds her to the usefulness of other paradigms, of other perspectives, of others ways of addressing her research question.

William McGuire gave an apt description of the importance of what could be called "**open-minded persistence**". He used the analogy of a Boy Scout lost in the woods, "If the boy strikes out in any one direction and keeps making progress in that direction, it is likely that he will eventually find his way out of the woods. It might be that if he had pursued a different line of progress he would have gotten out even sooner, but almost any line of advance will suffice if pursued sufficiently long. The only real danger is that one will wander around at random and never get out of the woods."

If we drop each theory, each fashion, each trend as soon as the slightest negative evidence crops up, there results the danger that we will wander around in circles and not obtain any clarification.

But when do we stop? Sometimes a research path is clearly not going anywhere. Sometimes the woods seem endless. I think most of us have suffered from **"Failed Replication Syndrome"**. We read an article about an interesting phenomenon, we are thrilled and think there is a nice extension to be made when X or Y is added. We decide to replicate and extend the experiment. In order to do so we read the procedure section and try to perform the experiment in a way as identical as possible to the published study. Everything is in place, but we fail to replicate the results. We try again. No luck. Again. Nothing. What is going on here? I have no idea. It frustrates me.

I think that often procedure sections exclude important information. Not because we intentionally leave out information that is necessary to replicate our experiments, but because we often do not know what exactly is driving the paradigm. There are many decisions we make in the design of an experiment that seem inconsequential, but later turn out be relatively important. More important than we could have guessed.

For every type of experiment, for every paradigm there seems to be a **"Hidden Procedure Section."** I was first confronted by the concept of "Hidden Procedures" when I started my research project on priming effects in person perception. I decided to ask several experts in the field for their

stimulus materials. Fortunately, many researchers sent back large envelopes with examples of the materials used in their studies. Pictures, photos, questionnaires, scenarios, pretests, pilots, everything. It was amazing. The vast majority of those materials, however, came with yellow post-it notes. Those post-it notes revealed the World of Hidden Procedures. They read something like:

"Do not run those materials on a computer. We tried it and it did not work. Paper and pencil is fine, however." OK.
"Do not use this procedure to prime dimension X. X does not seem to work for our students. Dimension Y is better." OK, that's what I will do then.
"After the priming procedure, I always wait at least 3 but no longer than 5 minutes before I give subjects the target stimulus. That works best."
"This experiment does not work in mass testing sessions. You have to run it in small groups, say 3 to 5 people."

Acknowledging the existence of Hidden Procedures means that we should pay close attention to the way a particular question is solved. What is the overarching perspective? Looking at research from this vantage point perhaps points us to the idiosyncrasies of the methods that have been used. Knowing which theoretical perspective drives an empirical study may enable us to compare and integrate separate fads and fashions in a precise and falsifiable way. Let's call this way of combining different types of research **"the integrated retro-look."**

The prime example of how separate fads and fashions may be combined in an integrated retro-look is the development in social cognition from the lay scientist model (people are scientists and reason rationally), to the cognitive miser model (people are lazy and use mental shortcuts), to the motivated tactician model, in which the previous two views have been integrated (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Sometimes the motivated thinker chooses wisely and rationally, sometimes she chooses quickly and defensively. We are scientists when we need to. We are misers when we can.

This integrative retro-look may also help to integrate other areas of social psychological research where a particular question is addressed from different, often diverging perspectives. A point in case is cognitive

dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory started as a grand theory of social behavior. As presented in broad and provocative brush strokes by Festinger in 1957, dissonance research began by positing that pairs of cognitions can be consonant or dissonant with each other. The existence of dissonance motivates the person to reduce the dissonance and leads to avoidance of information likely to increase the dissonance.

Over the years, cognitive dissonance research has become more precise, but also more factioned. The broad and general (but not very precise) statements of Festinger were replaced by **"but-only" theorising**. Dissonance arose from inconsistent cognitions, *but only* if there was free choice to act; *but only* if there was commitment to the counterattitudinal act, *but only* if an unwanted consequence had occurred; *but only* if the consequence was foreseeable, and so forth.

Alternatives to cognitive dissonance theory were developed: self-perception theory, impression-management theory, self-consistency theory, new look theory, and self-affirmation theory. Each of these theories was presented with a new paradigm, that slightly differed from the first, original experiments. There is the free-choice paradigm, the belief-confirmation paradigm, the effort-justification paradigm, the induced-compliance paradigm, and the hypocrisy paradigm. Each of these paradigms fit a certain version of the theory best. Choosing a paradigm is thus likely to create the verification of the theory you are interested in. For example, Cooper and Fazio's reformulation of dissonance theory refers and applies exclusively to studies using the induced-compliance paradigm.

Obviously what is needed is an integrative retro-look that throws a comprehensive net around these divergent perspectives. A net that is tight and precise enough to be tested and falsified, and strong and broad enough to describe a large range of dissonance-related phenomena

Besides cognitive dissonance we can probably all think of other research areas that may be moved forward by an integrative retro-look that integrates fashions by combining and comparing research paradigms. What such an integrative retro-look can buy us is, I think, well-illustrated by examples from the research area I am most familiar with: Research on the effects of contextual cues, of accessible knowledge on social judgment.

Knowledge accessibility research investigates how cognitively activated information may affect memory, judgment, and behavior. In a sense then, research on context effects touches upon the core of our field. Social psychology *is* the study of context effects. We (as social psychologists) are all interested in how our perceptions of and reactions to social reality are affected by the interplay of previous experiences and situational cues. Studies in context effects investigate the impact of such cues at a rather basic level.

OK. The question is how do contexts affect our judgments and behaviors? This is a tale of two answers. There are two perspectives, two histories, two paradigms, two answers.

Figure 1
Context for interpretation
What is this?
A duck or a rabbit?

Let's start with two famous perceptual illusions, that demonstrate two basic ways in which contexts may affect our perceptions. Brunswick's rabbit-duck illusion (as popularised by Wittgenstein) shows how contextual stimuli may guide our interpretation of ambiguous stimuli (see Figure 1). When you have just eaten Peking Duck in an exquisite Chinese restaurant, you are more likely to see a duck in this ambiguous figure. However, during the Easter season, when bunnies and rabbits are relatively likely to be cognitively activated, you are more likely to recognise this picture as a rabbit. What is on your mind guides how you interpret ambiguous stimuli. The Ebbinghaus illusion (see Figure 2) shows how contextual stimuli may affect our perception through comparison processes. The central circle appears to be smaller when surrounded by and

thus compared with by big circles (left panel). The central circle appears to be bigger when surrounded by and thus compared with small circles (right panel). Contextual cues may thus also result in contrast effects as a result of comparison processes (see also Stapel & Koomen, 1997).

Figure 2
Context for comparison
What is the size
Of the circle in the middle⸮

These two perceptual illusions, the assimilative rabbit-duck illusion and the contrastive Ebbinghaus illusion show that cognitively accessible knowledge (such as previous experiences, thoughts or readily available contextual cues) may result in assimilative interpretation effects as well as in contrastive comparison effects. Both these effects are not uncommon in social psychological research. We know that the impressions we form of the social objects that inhabit our social world are dependent on fleeting characteristics of the situation, but what role do these accessible knowledge structures play in the perception of our social worlds⸮ Do they act as rose-colored glasses, such that everything is painted in the same color, is given the same meaning as the cognitive structures that are accessible (as in the rabbit-duck illusion)⸮ Or are they typically used as an anchor, as a frame of reference to which everything else is compared (as in the Ebbinghaus illusion)⸮ What is the direction of knowledge accessibility effects⸮ When does knowledge accessibility result in assimilation (impressions shift toward the activated knowledge)⸮ When does it yield contrast (impressions shift away from the activated knowledge)⸮

When one examines the relevant literature in an attempt to answer these questions, one answer presents itself: It depends on the kind of literature one looks at. Different literatures give different explanations for the occurrence of assimilation and contrast. Depending on the theoretical meta-perspective from which one looks at the impact of accessible knowledge on impression formation processes, either assimilation or contrast is portrayed as the "typical" or "standard" effect.

In today's social psychology, that is social psychology of the late 1990s, the social cognition movement reigns and rules (see Higgins & Kruglanski, 1996). Hence the "dominant" perspective on knowledge accessibility effects has a cognitive focus. However, besides this dominant perspective, there exists a more classic and therefore relatively "dormant" perspective in social psychology that focuses not on the *interpretative* but on the *comparative* processes that may be instigated by cognitively activated information. These two perspectives come to different conclusions when it concerns the direction of knowledge accessibility effects. Specifically, investigations of knowledge accessibility effects that take an information-processing perspective and thus tend to emphasize the ways in which accessible knowledge affect the categorization or encoding of social stimuli, often conclude that "assimilation" is the most typical knowledge accessibility effect. Conversely, investigations that are rooted in studies of psychophysics and comparative judgment and thus are especially interested in the ways in which accessible knowledge affects the representation of the comparison standards that are used in the construction of social judgment, tend to portray "contrast" as the most natural context effect. Let's give a few examples of each research tradition.

THE DOMINANT HISTORY: CATEGORY ACCESSIBILITY

The dominant approach to the study of knowledge accessibility effects probably received its major impetus from Bruner's (1957) paper "On Perceptual Readiness." Bruner proposed that the readiness with which a person classifies information in terms of a particular category is an indicator of the accessibility of that category. The greater the "accessibility" of stored categorical knowledge, the more likely it would be used to categorise stimulus information, even when the stimulus

information was impoverished or distantly related. Although Bruner introduced the term "category accessibility" in the late 1950s, in social psychology the use of this construct as a psychological variable did not bear fruit until the 1970s. Not surprisingly, this resurgence of the concept of accessibility coincided with the coming of the social cognition movement. Bruner's description of accessibility effects has a undeniable cognitive flavor: Accessible constructs are readily used in the <u>processing</u> (e.g., encoding, storage, retrieval) of information. Thus, in the mid 1970s, several studies demonstrated that once a target stimulus is encoded, interpreted as an instance of a particular category, the implications of this encoding will become relatively accessible and are therefore more likely to be used as a basis for subsequent judgments about the target than the original information. The most straightforward evidence for this claim came from a seminal study by Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977), who invited participants to participate in two (ostensibly unrelated) tasks. Participants were first required to perform a "perception" task that involved exposure to a number of different trait concepts as part of a Stroop task. In one condition, participants were exposed to synonyms of the trait "adventurous", whereas other participants were exposed to synonyms of the trait "reckless". In an ostensibly unrelated subsequent study on "reading comprehension , participants were given an ambiguous behavioral description of a stimulus person (Donald) that could be interpreted as either adventurous or reckless. It was found that participants who had had prior exposure to the "adventurous" concept perceived the stimulus person as more adventurous, whereas participants who had had prior exposure to the "reckless" concept perceived the stimulus person as more reckless. Similar effects were found in a subsequent and well-cited paper by Srull and Wyer (1979). These investigators also performed the unrelated-task paradigm to demonstrate that the surreptitious activation of trait concepts (hostile, friendly) may guide the interpretation of an ambiguous stimulus (friendly/hostile Donald) and induce assimilation.

The assimilation effects reported in the Higgins et al. and Srull-Wyer studies have been replicated in many subsequent studies in which person judgments are preceded by trait (e.g., adventurous-reckless) priming. However, the general hypothesis that accessible knowledge may guide interpretation processes has also been corroborated using knowledge other

than trait concepts. Its has been demonstrated time and again that accessible attitudes (see research by Lord et al.), stereotypes (see research by Sagar & Schofield) moods (see research Forgas), emotions (see research Niedenthal), expectancies (see research by Neuberg), and motivations (see research by Gollwitzer and Bargh) may guide subsequent judgment and behavior in an assimilative manner.

IS ASSIMILATION THE DEFAULT?

A quick review of investigations of the impact of accessible trait concepts, stereotypes, moods, emotions, and attitudes on categorisation and interpretation processes shows that social cognition research has documented abundant evidence for the notion that accessible knowledge is likely to result in *assimilation* effects. The abundance of assimilation effects in studies of knowledge accessibility effects has led some authors to conclude that assimilation is the "basic effect of recent and frequent activation" (Higgins, 1989, p. 78) and one of the more "fundamental" findings of modern social psychology (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991, p. 170). Several researchers have argued that assimilation is the "natural" knowledge accessibility effect. Accessible knowledge is more likely to lead to assimilation than contrast in subsequent judgments (see for a review Stapel & Koomen, in press). For example, Martin, Seta, and Crelia's (1990) set/reset model of knowledge accessibility effects contends that assimilation is the most "natural" effect because the processes underlying it involve only a few cognitive steps: "contrast involves more cognitive steps than does assimilation" (p. 29). And indeed, several studies have convincingly demonstrated that assimilation effects seem to be more easily obtained than contrast effects when subjects are distracted, low in need for cognition, or unaware of the impact of the activated information.

However, it should be noted that most of the studies demonstrating that assimilation effects require less cognitive resources than contrast effects have looked at the impact of accessible knowledge from a predominantly "cognitive" perspective. As Mervis and Rosch (1981, p. 89) have argued, one of the basic tenets of the cognitive or information processing perspective in modern psychology is the belief that categorization is one of the most fundamental aspects of cognition: "Categorization may be

considered one of the most basic functions of living creatures." As an off-spring of cognitive psychology, social cognition research has emphasized the question how social knowledge may affect social categorization processes. In doing so the importance of the accessibility construct was demonstrated. Social cognition research has shown convincingly how different kinds of accessible cognitive structures (e.g., traits, attitudes, stereotypes) may guide the *interpretation* of target information. As Carlston and Smith (1996) argue, given that the encoding or interpretation of a stimulus involves the integration of that material with existing knowledge, it makes sense that these processes will tend to be influenced by the particular subset of cognitions that is most accessible. Logically, the influence of information that is used to "fill in" features missing in the target stimulus is assimilative. Hence, one may argue, a cognitive approach to the study of knowledge accessibility effects is likely to find interpretative assimilation effects.

THE DORMANT HISTORY: COMPARISON EFFECTS

We believe that because of the success of the social cognition movement in general and category accessibility research in particular, studies that have looked at the impact of accessible knowledge on processes other than categorization and interpretation have been largely neglected in theorizing about the consequences of knowledge accessibility for social judgment.

Social judgment research takes another approach and proposes that such judgmental differences may be the result of people *comparing* the target stimulus against different standards. Social judgment research focuses on the comparative nature of judgment. As Eiser (1990, p. 10) writes in his review of the social judgment literature, "all judgments are comparative." That is, there is no judgment when there is no (implicit or explicit) comparison. The comparative nature of judgment implies that the context in which a stimulus is embedded may provide a frame of reference when constructing a judgment of this stimulus. Thus, chronically or contextually activated information may not only serve as an interpretation frame but also as a comparison standard during impression formation. Historically, the first studies of how the context in which a stimulus is evaluated may act as a comparison standard in judgments of

that stimulus, were performed by researchers interested in psychophysical phenomena. Consider, for example, a task requiring subjects to identify the intensity of a number of auditory tones which vary in their degree of loudness. Whether or not a tone will be classified as "very loud" depends, among other things, on the other tones being judged in the experimental session. In the context of several relatively loud tones, a medium range tone will be judged as louder than in the context of several relatively quiet tones. This type of contextual influence is termed *comparison contrast* because judgments are contrasted away from the values in the surrounding context to which the target can be compared (Long, 1937). People experience the pleasantness, size, weight, or color of a target as relative to the contextually activated information because they see the target in *comparison* with this information. Contextually activated information thus affects the representation of the reference points we use in constructing our judgments.

Comparison contrast effects have also been found for judgments of psychosocial stimuli. Most notably perhaps, Sherif and Hovland, applied principles of psychophysical and comparative judgment to the domain of attitudes. They assumed that, similar to the impact of context on target stimuli, people's *prior* attitudes may distort their perceptions of other people's attitudinal positions. In general terms, their theory assumes that a recipient's own attitudinal position serves as a judgmental standard or anchor that influences where along an evaluative continuum a communicator's advocated position is perceived to lie. A prominent example of this mechanism is given by a study of Vallone, Ross, and Lepper (1985). These investigators presented pro-Israeli and pro-Arab student partisans (as well as some "neutral" students) with excerpts from television news coverage of the "Beirut massacre" of 1984. Whereas the neutral students rated the broadcast summaries as being relatively unbiased, the partisans' ratings showed contrast away from the judges' (extreme) attitudes. Pro-Arab and pro-Israeli viewers alike were convinced that the other side had been favored by the media, that their own side had been treated unfairly, and that these biases in reporting had reflected the self-interests and ideologies of those responsible for the program. Pepitone and DiNubile also found comparison contrast effects in psychosocial judgment. They found that when judging the severity of a crime, people rate a target crime as more atrocious when judgment of this crime is

preceded by evaluating a mild criminal offense (an assault) than after judging a more heinous act (homicide). Tanaka-Matsumi, Attivissimo, Nelson, and D'Urso found comparison contrast effects in people's judgments of emotionally expressive faces. These authors first showed participants photographs of faces that expressed happiness, sadness, or anger, and then showed them a neutral target face. Neutral faces were judged to be less happy, sad, and anger, respectively, compared to the judgments of participants who were only exposed to the target face. Comparable contrastive comparison effects have been found *inter alia* for judgments of affect (see research Manis), the physical attractiveness of others (see research by Kenrick), and, of course, self perception (see social comparison research, for example Morse and Gergen's Mister Clean, Mister Dirty study).

Is Contrast The Default?

There is abundant evidence in the literature that accessible knowledge may not only serve the role of an interpretation frame in the encoding and interpretation of stimuli --as studies of category accessibility have convincingly shown-- but also act as a comparison standard in the judgment of these stimuli. Research that has been interested in the comparative nature of (social) judgment, that is in the ways in which incoming stimulus information to subjective standards in memory, has demonstrated time and again that knowledge accessibility may determine the cognitive representation of the standards that are used to judge these target stimuli. Interestingly, whereas there is tendency in social cognition research to go beyond the information given when assimilative interpretation effects are taken to mean that assimilation is the basic effect in all types of accessibility-driven judgments, students of comparative judgment have argued that contrast is the most natural effect of contextually activated information. For example, Herr, Sherman, and Fazio (1983, p. 325) write that "the predominant context effect in the social judgment literature is the contrast effect. It has often been noted that the judgment of a given target stimulus is inversely related to the values of the stimuli that accompany it." Similarly, Eiser (1990, p. 11) argues that "the most predictable effect" of context stimuli on target judgments "is an effect known as contrast" and Brown et al. (1992, p. 717)

concur that "it is well-established that judgments are influenced by the frame of reference that surrounding stimuli provide (Helson, 1964). The usual finding is a contrast effect: The judgment of a target stimulus is displaced away from the judgment of an anchor."

AN INTEGRATION

My reading of the "dormant" history of knowledge accessibility effects thus brings us to a conclusion that is completely opposite to the conclusion that could be based on my reading of the "dominant" history of such effects. Whereas social judgment studies suggest that contrast is the most typical context effect, social cognition research suggests that assimilation is more common than contrast. One way to remedy this paradox is to point at the metatheoretical interests the two approaches have been taken. Social cognition research is primarily concerned with issues of categorization and interpretation, whereas the social comparison and judgment approach primarily focuses on the context-bound and comparative nature of all sorts of social judgments. These meatatheoretical interests may have created specific empirical effects.

Social cognition researchers are mainly interested in issues and effects of categorization. Because of this interest, they design studies and use stimuli that are most likely to yield (assimilative) interpretation and categorization effects. In other words, social cognition studies of knowledge accessibility effects use priming stimuli that are most likely to be used during interpretation and encoding (such as abstract traits, general categories, and schemas).

Social judgment researchers are mainly interested in issues and effects of comparison. Because of this interest, they design studies and use stimuli that are most likely to yield (contrastive) comparison effects. In other words, social judgement studies of knowledge accessibility effects use priming stimuli that are most likely to be used as comparison standards (such as concrete exemplars, objects, and entities) (see for a more elaborate discussion of this argument, Stapel et al., 1996, 1997; Stapel & Koomen, in press).

To test the "metatheory guides selection of priming stimuli and this leads to certain results" hypothesis, I performed several experiments in which classic trait priming (as used in the social cognition domain) and exemplar priming (as used in the social judgment domain) procedures were integrated. The argument is then that these priming techniques differ in the kind of information they activate and therefore in the *role* they play in impression formation. Whereas primed trait concepts (e.g., "hostility") are more likely to serve to interpret an ambiguous person description in the encoding stage of the impression formation process, primed person exemplars --if sufficiently extreme (e.g., "Hitler")-- will predominantly be used as a comparison standard against which the evaluation of target persons is contrasted in the judgment stage.

In one study, we (Stapel, Koomen, & Van der Pligt, 1997) asked respondents to form an impression of an ambiguous target stimulus, friendly/hostile Donald. Before they were exposed to the description of Donald, respondents were primed with names of traits or person exemplars. Half of the participants were primed with names of either extremely hostile or friendly *persons* (e.g., "Dracula," "Hitler" versus "Ghandi", "Mandela"). The other half of the participants were exposed to names of either extremely hostile or friendly *traits* (e.g., "mean," "violent" versus "nice," "gentle"). As predicted by the analysis of the metatheoretical perspectives underlying earlier research on knowledge accessibility effects, assimilation was found in the trait priming conditions, whereas contrast was found in the person priming conditions (see Figure 3). This pattern of findings thus indicates that exposure to trait primes may result in assimilative interpretation effects, whereas the subtle priming of person exemplars is more likely to result in contrast effects (for further evidence that these effects are indeed mediated by interpretation versus comparison processes see Stapel & Koomen, under review, in press).

	Traits	Persons
Friendly	4.1	3.1
Hostile	2.9	4.1

Higher scores denote more positive ratings on a 9-point scale.

Figure 3
Priming Traits versus Person Exemplars and Judgments
of Ambiguous friendly/hostile Donald

Stapel and Spears (1996) applied this line of reasoning perspective to analogical reasoning. These authors, investigating the effects produced by analogies in the judgment of target stimuli they are supposed to embellish demonstrated that when an analogy constitutes subtle background information that activates certain abstract features (e.g., "an unjust war" when the Vietnam War is used as an analogy to the Gulf War), people use these features to interpret the target stimulus, producing assimilation. However, when analogies constitute foreground information that activates distinct feature-analogy links (e.g., "The Vietnam War was unjust") that can be compared with the target stimulus, people's judgments show more contrast between the analogy and the target (e.g., "The Gulf War was a just war"). In other words, the more *abstract* the primed knowledge ("unjust"), the more likely it is that judgments of target stimuli will be assimilated to it. Likewise, contrast effects are more likely to the extent that the primed information is a concrete exemplar that can be used for comparison.

Dijksterhuis, Spears, Postmes, Stapel, Koomen, Van Knippenberg, & Scheepers (1998) found that the differences between traits and persons exemplars may also determine whether priming yields assimilation or contrast in ideomotor behavior. John Bargh and his colleagues showed that exposing individuals to a series of words linked to a particular stereotype may influence behavior nonconsciously. Priming trait concepts influences

subsequent behavior in an assimilative fashion. For example, subjects who were subtly exposed to traits linked to the elderly stereotype (gray, old, wrinkle, ancient, wise), walked more slowly than subjects who had not been primed with these words. Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) applied the analysis of assimilative priming stimuli versus contrastive priming stimuli to the Bargh et al. studies. The assimilative trait priming effects were replicated, but it was also found that activation of comparison relevant exemplars led to contrastive ideomotor effects. For example, Dutch subjects walked *faster* when primed with a well-known *exemplar* of the elderly, the Dutch Queen Mother, who is over eighty years old (see Figure 4).

	Stereotype	Neutral	Queen Mother
Mean walking time to elevator	18.1 seconds	17.3 seconds	15.7 seconds

Figure 4
Effects on behaviour

CONCLUSIONS

What do these data tell us? Well, I hope they tell us about the determinants of assimilation and contrast effects in perception, judgment, and behavior. When contextual information is used primarily for interpretation, assimilation is likely to occur. When contextual information is used primarily for comparison, contrast is more likely.

How do these data relate to the first part of my talk? Well, I hope they illustrate the fruitfulness of the "integrative retro-look." I hope my review shows the paradigm-contingent nature of social psychological research and the importance of searching for Hidden Procedures. A careful study of <u>how</u> we investigate things, how an experiment is set up, may sometimes

inform us about <u>what</u> exactly we are studying.

I hope my review shows that what we think is "natural" often depends on our theoretical perspective and that in a sense this theoretical perspective <u>creates</u> the data we are looking for. Those interested in categorization find assimilation. Those interested in comparison find contrast. It is important to note that my review also makes clear that it is important that paradigms are followed to their extremes. Only <u>then</u> is integration needed, possible, and worthwhile. The interpretation/social cognition paradigm and the comparison/social judgment paradigm have both been successful because they were not abandoned prematurely. Integration is only possible when the risky, difficult, and innovative groundwork has been done.
I think our interpretation/comparison model of assimilation and contrast effects strikes a pretty good balance between scope and precision. It integrates previous perspectives <u>and</u> it is falsifiable. The model is also broad in its implications. It has been applied in the domain of attribution, stereotyping, person perception, self perception and behavior, organizational decision making, advertising effects and consumer psychology, and political and public opinion research

But of course the interpretation/comparison model is not the end of the story. Like any other theory, the interpretation/comparison model is wrong. It is a lie. I hope the future brings us refutations and falsifications. Sooner or later, someone will come along with a richer, more innovative, more integrative conceptualization of context and accessibility effects.

Perhaps what I have said and argued the past hour is plain and self-evident. If so, I would like to end with a quote from nobel-laureate Erwin Schrödinger, who wrote:

"It seems plain and self-evident, yet it needs to be said: The isolated knowledge obtained by a group of specialists in a narrow field has in itself no value whatsoever, but only in its synthesis with all the rest of knowledge and only inasmuch as it really contributes in this synthesis toward answering the demand, "Who are we?"

Thank you.

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Book Reviews

The Bulletin will publish two types of book review.

Review Articles (up to 1000 words) provide detailed critical commentary on major monographs or books, for example, that propose new theoretical directions. These will be published on an occasional basis in our regular 'Articles' section.

The Bulletin also plans to publish *Short Reviews* of new books in social psychology as a regular feature. These will be published in the 'Book Reviews' section of the Bulletin. The idea is to provide a forum that will alert EAESP members to important and interesting social psychology books, reasonably soon after publication. We hope that members of the Association will participate in this process by expressing willingness to review books when invited to do so. The books reviewed will generally be monographs or edited collections written by or of interest to social psychologists. Authors do not have to be members of the Association, but it is hoped that many of the books reviewed books will be by members. Some reviews may assess a selection of books (e.g. text books) to provide a comparative analysis.

Guidance for Reviewers

Short Reviews should be fairly brief (e.g. 250-500 words maximum). In general they should begin by stating the market and scope of the book. The review should describe how the book relates to other books published recently or forthcoming, and should comment on its strengths and (if any) weaknesses. Any distinctive or controversial aspects of the book should also be highlighted. We will also print the contents list (e.g. for edited books) and publication/price details.

Reviewers do not have to be members of the Association, but should be working in an area that is covered by the book they are reviewing. Reviewers will receive a copy of the book (or if they already have a copy, an alternative from the same publisher). Although reviews will generally

be on an invited basis, if you wish to provide a short review of a particular book please contact the Secretary (Dominic Abrams).

The deadlines for submission of reviews are the end of October, the end of February and the end of August each year. Reviews should be submitted as an email attachment or on disk to the Administrative Secretary (Sibylle Classen), email: clasen@uni-muenster.de

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Resolving Social Dilemmas: Dynamic, Structural, and Intergroup Aspects (1999*)*, edited by Margaret Foddy, Michael Smithson, Sherry Schneider, & Michael Hogg[1].
Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. (388 Pages; 23 Chapters; References; Glossary; Index), ISBN: 0863775748. Price in GBP 49.95.
Publisher's web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk or www.psypress.com

Review by **R. Scott Tindale** (Loyola University Chicago – currently visiting at the Centre for Research on Group Processes, University of Kent)

Resolving social dilemmas has become one of the hottest topics in the social and behavioral sciences over the past 30 years. The present volume attests to this interest as it is based, in part on the 7th International Conference on Social Dilemmas that has been held to date. Rarely do conferences on single topics become institutionalized – and rarely does research on a single topic span so many disciplines and approaches.

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[1] Magret Foddy is an Associate Professor at the School of Psychological Science at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. In addition to experimental studies of social dilemmas her reserach interests include status processes in small groups, ability evaluation and gender stereotypes.
Michael Smithson is in the Division of Psychology at the Australian National University. His research interests are uncertainty and ignorance, and he is the author of *Statistics with Confidence* (Sage, 1999).
Sherry Schneider is a Senior Lecturer in Organisational Psychology at Monash University, Melbourne. Her research interests are in group and team dynamics, decision making, leadership and technology.
Michael A. Hogg is Professor of Psychology and the University of Queensland. He is co-editor of the journal *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, and has published widely in the aeras of social identity, social cognition and intergroup relations. His recent books include *Social Identity and Social Cognition* (Blackwell 1999), and *Attitudes, Behaviour and Social Context* (Erlbaum 1999).

Although there are a number of recent texts and edited volumes on social dilemmas, the present volume has much to recommend it as needed addition. It starts with a general overview chapter (Smithson & Foddy) demonstrating the breadth and depth of the field, as well as the epistemological status of theory and research to date. It then continues in three broad sections. The first involves "formal models and dynamic systems approaches" (Smithson; Takagi; Watanabe & Yamagishi; Rapoport & Amaldoss; Au & Budescu). Based on mathematical and computer models, these chapters discuss the results of experimental and simulation studies covering a wide range of different types of dilemmas and explore various aspects of each. They draw on previous theory and research, but also expand beyond and qualify it in a number of important ways. The main emphases are on structural and dynamic aspects of the environment and peoples perceptions of and reactions to those aspects.

The second section discusses a series of control system and sturctural approaches to solving dilemmas (Kerr; Van Vugt; Franzen; Suleiman & Or-Chen; Beckenkamp & Ostmann; Chen; Webb).   The main theme from this section seems to be that "things are not as simple as they sometimes appear". A number of the chapters question the generality of previous findings and argue for more focused attempts at understanding exactly what are the underlying mechanisms that influence responses to the environmental and structural solutions that have previously been proposed. The third section is entitled "linking individual and group processes" (Messick; Garling, Gustafsson, & Biel; Hertel; Biel, Von Borgstede, & Dahlstrand; Schneider & Sundali; Gavill; Schopler & Insko; Morrison; Foddy & Hogg; Brewer & Schneider). Although implicit throughout the volume, this section drives home the need to focus on more than a single level (individual, group, intergroup, societal, etc.) when trying to understand social dilemmas of different types and scopes. The final chapter presents a nested model of causal influences that both helps to frame research on social dilemmas thus far as well as to identify the influences that helped to shape individual and collective behavior over time.

Besides the list of scholars included as authors, the strengths of the present volume stem both from its breadth and depth.   Both the questions and theoretical/empirical attempts at answers are drawn from almost every

area of the social and behavioral sciences – psychological, sociological, political, economic, evolutionary, and philosophical perspectives are all represented. The volume also encompasses multiple theoretical orientations and methodological perspectives. However, the chapters do not provide simple overviews – they go into depth concerning the theoretical issues involved, the methods and procedures used, and the potential implications for the specific questions of interest. Thus, it is useful reading for both the advanced novice wanting to learn more about the field and the serious social dilemma researcher wanting a summary of the latest theory and research findings.

Imagine the following experiment which was conducted when "the French state education system was testing out 'group levels', which involved dividing classes into relatively homogeneous groups with respect to the students' various competences. " Eight secondary school students, who do not know each other, are gathered in the same classroom. Four of them are excellent students and the four others are poor achievers. In half of the conditions, it is made explicit which students are poor or good. In the other conditions, students are induced to think that they all belong to the same level (poor or good). They all receive a biology lesson by an

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[1] Jean-Marc Monteil founded the Laboratory of Social Psychology in Clermont-Ferrand. He continued doing research at the same time that he accepted heavy administrative and political duties such as president of his university. He is currently Recteur of the Académie de Bordeaux, the largest one of France.
Pascal Huguet is Charché de Recherches at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and works at the Université Blaise Pascal of Clermont-Ferrand. He is involved in different research projects with European, American and Australian colleagues. He is also one of the co-organizers of the Summer-School to be held in Clermont-Ferrand in 2000.

unknown teacher. In half of the cases, the teacher informs the students that he will not ask questions during his lesson. In the other half, every student expects to be questioned during the lesson. No question is ever asked but the lesson is followed by a written test concerning the material just covered.

When the students believed that they were part of a homogeneous group, the good students performed rather well whereas the poor students did very badly. These unsurprising results were independent of the fact that questions would be or would not be asked. The picture is completely different when the students have been identified by previous performance level. When the past academic history had been made explicit and when students did not expect to be interrogated, good and poor students performed equally well. However, when they expected to be questioned in front of their classmates, students who were labelled as 'good' did remarkably well, whereas students labelled as 'poor' performed badly. In other words, if I am a good student in a heterogeneous group and if I expect to have to prove my value, I will pay more attention to the lesson than if I do not have such expectation. If I am a poor student among good ones but know that I will not be singled out by the teacher asking me questions, I will do as well as usually good students. In contrast if I am a poor student surrounded by an elite, and I expect to be questioned (if I expect that my –usually poor - answer will be made public), I will confirm my past history of academic failures. This latter pattern of results started 20 years of research summarised in this fascinating book.

One chapter is devoted to the social control of academic performance. Among many other findings, the authors show that the same interaction as described above is obtained when high and low achievers have to memorize "Rey's complex figure" presented as related to competence in geometry or in drawing. There is no difference between students who believed that their drawing capacities were tested, but there is a huge difference when they think that the figure measures their level in geometry.

Another chapter deals with the "autobiographical attention effect". I was especially attracted by one set of data that reminded me of my school-years (such a long time ago!). Before a math class, high and low achievers

received the feedback that they had failed in a previous task. "On their desk, in the top left corner, a sheet of paper was placed on which a series of small geometrical figures of various shapes and sizes were drawn. The participants' attention was never directed towards this particular feature of their work setting." After the lesson came a math test followed by a memory test of the geometrical figures. Who had best memorized the incidental task? I leave the answer to your imagination but I can tell you that there is a tremendous difference between the two types of students. Think of who is usually looking out of the window during a lesson… Much of this research involves social comparison. Two chapters are devoted to the various attempts at theorizing the phenomenon and to support an attentional focus theory (by elegant tests using the Stroop task). I have a regret here: it deals with the way Cottrell is pejoratively restricted to classical conditioning. My understanding of Cottrell's contribution was that he showed that the "other" (person or animal) is never neutral; the "other" always has a meaning for conspecifics, a meaning that depends on the past experiences of the subjects. It seems to me that Cottrell's perspective is completely in line with the authors' focus on autobiographical experiences. It also explains social facilitation among humans as well as among animals, which is not the case of the attentional focus theory.

The final empirical chapter deals with co-action and social loafing. Here again, one finds the importance of the first results presented in this review. For instance, boys working as co-actors performed better when they expected the results to be made public rather than to remain anonymous; the contrary pattern occurred for girls.

I hope I have made it clear from this review that Monteil and Huguet are interested in three elements working in a system. The object as it is socially constructed (e.g., geometry vs. drawing), the social context (e.g., anonymity vs. visibility), and the history of the person (e.g., good or poor students). These three notions are discussed in the first two chapters where the authors define what they call a "social psychology of cognition"."The social psychology of cognition investigates neither pure cognition nor social cognition….As such, it explains neither the isolated individual lost in thought, like Tolman's rat, nor the individual lost in images of other people" (from S.T. Fiske's preface). This insistence on the

social insertion is reminiscent of Tajfel's social dimension. The European monographs in social psychology, founded by Tajfel, could not have been a better outlet for such a book.

I took a great pleasure in reading this book. It is full of insights, often theoretically provocative, at other times concerned with practical implications. I am not sure, however, that people outside cognitive social psychology will be able to benefit of this very dense book as much as they maybe would like. I found that some summaries of past research or theories implied a great knowledge from the reader. Fortunately, the findings are so intriguing that they almost force you to seek this other information.

Social identity: Context, commitment, content (1999), edited by Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje[1]. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 228 pages. Price in UKP £55 hardback, £15.99 paperback
ISBN 0-631-20690 -6 and 0-631-20691-4
Publishers web site: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk

Review by **Steve Hinkle** (Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, USA)

This volume represents as positive and valuable a contribution to the social identity tradition as anything else to appear in recent years. With the exception of an introductory chapter by John Turner, the remaining nine chapters of the book summarise the past five years work by what the book itself refers to as the Amsterdam school of social identity research. Presented in detail is the research of the editors in a series of chapters they have co-authored with their numerous collaborators. To the editors' credit, they have not hesitated to include a significant number of studies that are not yet published. While this could be a risky choice, it seems fully warranted by the quality and importance of the presented research.

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[1] Naomi Ellemers is Professor of Psychology at Leiden University, Russel Spears is Professor in Experimental Psychology at the University of Amsterdam where Bertjan Doosje is also Post Doctoral Research Fellow. Their research interests include intergroup relations, social identity and categorisation processes in laboratory and organisational settings. They have also recently published *The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life* (Spears, Oakes, Ellemers & Haslam, 1997, Blackwell).

The themes that pervade the book are context, commitment, and content. The meaning of group membership and salience and magnitude of social identification are highly dependent on the social context. This has been one of the central themes of self-categorization theory. In this volume, the importance of context is demonstrated repeatedly from the contribution of social context in contributing to the experience of difference types of threats to identity to context's importance as a determinant of the relative effects of personal and collective deprivation.

Commitment concerns social identification. Variation in group members' attachment to a specific group is well documented. While identification is oftentimes viewed as a dependent variable, the research in this volume makes clear its importance as an independent or predictor variable, frequently moderating relationships between variables such as category distinctiveness and perceived group homogeneity or intergroup similarity and ingroup favoritism.

Content concerns the role of specific group norms and dimensions of intergroup comparison. Integration of norms and comparison dimensions into the theoretical calculus of social identity, self-categorization, and, more generally, intergroup processes is essential. In its absence, there is no basis for understanding the specific attitudes and behaviors where social identity processes will be seen. For example, research reported here details the role of social norms in determining deindividuation effects.

Turner's introductory chapter includes an excellent summary of the key points of the social identity and self-categorization theories, and also clearly delineates their differences. Its critique of research concerning the relationships between identification, self-esteem, and ingroup favoritism seems oddly misplaced in a volume emphasizing the critical moderating effects of commitment. Still for those of us who have struggled to find quick and efficient ways to orient new social psychology students to the social identity theory perspective, it would be hard to beat the first third of Turner's present chapter coupled with the 1979 Tajfel and Turner chapter.

This raises the issue of the book's appropriateness for various audiences. Since its focus is the Amsterdam school, the volume by itself does not

serve as a comprehensive overview of recent social identity literature. It certainly would be a valuable text for advanced undergraduate or graduate teaching on social identity or intergroup issues, but would require supplementation from other books and primary sources. On the other hand, the importance of this body of research is without question; all active group and intergroup processes researchers should be aware of this work. The book provides an interesting, accessible, and comprehensive summary.

Social Dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression (1999). Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto[1]
Cambridge University Press, 384 pp, ISBN 0-421-62290-5, $49.95 or £35
Publisher's web site http://www.cup.org or http://www/cup.cam.ac.uk

Review by **Deborah Prentice** (University of Princeton)

Why is group-based social inequality so common and so difficult to eradicate? This is the central question addressed in Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto's *Social Dominance*, an impressive new monograph that is essential reading for researchers of intergroup relations, as well as anyone interested in major theories in social psychology.

The centerpiece of *Social Dominance* is social dominance theory, a far-reaching, integrative account of the psychological and social-structural bases of group hierarchy and oppression. Social dominance theory draws on ideas from authoritarian personality theory, social identity theory, Marxism, evolutionary theory, and many others to develop something genuinely novel in modern-day social psychology: A comprehensive theory that transcends disciplinary boundaries and levels of analysis. Some of the

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[1] Jim Sidanius is Professor of Psychology Center of Study of Soceity and Politics at the University of California Los Angeles. He is Vice President of the International Society of Political Psychology
Felicia Pratto is Associate Professor at Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs. Her research interests include attention and consciousness, prejudice and discrimination and social cognition

premises of social dominance theory will be familiar and uncontroversial to social psychologists – for example, that stereotyping is a natural outgrowth of the constraints placed on human information processing and that there are individual differences in the extent to which individuals hold and act on negative intergroup attitudes. Other premises will be more controversial. For example, social dominance theory maintains that members of subordinate groups, like members of dominant groups, endorse stereotypes and help to perpetuate the system that oppresses them. It also suggests that group dominance has an evolutionary basis. With these and many other provocative claims, *Social Dominance* will provoke strong reactions in many, if not most, readers. However, in the context of this very intelligent and scholarly book, the controversial aspects of the theory are productive: They challenge readers to think about these oft-analyzed issues in new and exciting ways.

This book is the product of more than a decade of work by Sidanius, Pratto, and their colleagues, and their sustained effort shows in the well-developed theoretical analysis and in the extensive body of evidence they have adduced to support their claims. Much of *Social Dominance* is devoted to empirical evidence, an impressive amount collected by the authors and their colleagues but even more adduced from other sources. The data are fascinating and informative, regardless of how much one agrees with the authors' theory. They make a compelling case for the ubiquity of group hierarchy and discrimination and for the important role that all of us play in the perpetuation of group dominance.

To date, social dominance theory has not had a broad impact on the study of intergroup relations in social psychology. It draws on most existing theories of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, but has not had reciprocal influences on their development. Its psychological precepts – the individual-difference construct of social dominance orientation and the notions of hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths – have not yet been adopted widely by researchers working within other traditions. The publication of *Social Dominance* should change this state of affairs by serving as the impetus for researchers to consider the implications of social dominance theory for their own domains of inquiry.

New Books by Members

This book, written from a cognitivist's perspective, deals with the psychology of literary narratives. The present approach is in line with those ecological conceptions of cognitive psychology that make the cognitive processes dependent on the contexts where they take place, conceptions that not only accommodate the "cold", emotionless, analytical cognising, but also their emotion-driven dynamics, and place cognition into social and cultural context. From a text-processing perspective, the book investigates the hypothesis that literary text processing is part of the more general issues of language processing through a series of empirical studies with Hungarian, European and American short stories.

The book also presents the social-cognitive approach to literary comprehension, which deals with the knowledge that readers mobilise when reading literary narratives. Using a somewhat old-fashioned word, it is content-oriented in the sense that it aims at uncovering how readers interpret the content of the narrative. It can be conceived a kind of empirical hermeneutics or empirical constructionism, where the construction of the meaning of a literary narrative is mapped in terms of social knowledge or social representations.

Future EAESP Meetings

Small Group Meeting
on Counterfactual Thinking
May 16-18, 2001, Aix-en-Provence, France

(Organizers: David R. Mandel, University of Hertfordshire; Denis Hilton, Universite de Toulouse II - le Mirail; Patrizia Catellani, Catholic University of Milan).

Over the past decade or so, an increasing number of social psychologists worldwide have sought to understand the antecedents, consequences, and functions of counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking is a ubiquitous form of thought that involves bringing to mind ways in which past events might have happened differently. Counterfactual thinking research spans several traditional topics in social psychology including attributional thinking (e.g., attributions of causality, preventability, blame, and responsibility), judgment and decision making (e.g., assessments of culpability and compensation in social and legal contexts; effects on future strategy selection and on choice), emotion (e.g., cognitive mediation of emotional responses to the negative and/or disconfirming outcomes), and comparative thinking (e.g., relation between counterfactual thinking and social comparison processes).

We are organizing a small group meeting to explore these issues. Our hope is to bring about 20-25 researchers and provide them with a unique forum to learn about and discuss the latest empirical and theoretical work concerning counterfactual thinking. The meeting will consist of a series of 45-min. talks (30 min presentation plus 15 min question time) culminating in a round-table discussion on the final day.

There is no registration fee for the conference. However, the cost of accommodations at La Baume for the full period is approximately 700

French Francs per person. In exceptional cases, we may be able to provide financial aid to attend the conference.

We are currently inviting submissions for proposed talks, and particularly encourage the participation of interested EAESP members. To submit a proposal, please send your name, affiliation, contact information (e-mail and postal address, phone number), and a 200-250 word summary of your proposed talk (with a few key words) to David Mandel at D.R.Mandel@herts.ac.uk by **November 1, 2000**. For inquiries, please contact any one of the organizers (e-mail Denis Hilton at hilton@univ-tlse2.fr and Patrizia Catellani at catellan@mi.unicatt.it).

Reports of Previous Meetings

Small Group Meeting

On The Role of Homogeneity and Entitativity in Intergroup Relations

At Louvain-la-Neuve, July 4-7, 1999

A few words on the Small Group Conference on "Perceptions of Group Variability and Entitivity" held in July 1999 at the Catholic University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. Organizers: V. Yzerbyt, C. Judd, O. Corneille.

A fundamental issue in social psychology is the perception and judgment of groups of individuals. Of particular interest are questions focusing on the extent to which groups are seen as homogeneous or heterogeneous and the extent to which they are seen as entities versus disparate aggregations of individuals. Because of the theoretical interest this topic sparks among social psychologists, we organized a conference on the general topic of "Perceptions of Group Variability and Entitativity" at the Catholic

University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve in Belgium, July 1999. As far as we can tell, and reading from the comments and reactions we received from various participants, the conference was a tremendous success. We all benefited from a large number of important research presentations and experienced extensive fruitful theoretical exchanges.

The presentations revolved around three very general and important issues. A first set of presentations focused on the individual perceiver and the factors that affect his or her processing of information about groups. More specifically, those presentations were concerned with the individual perceiver and how his or her capacities, needs, resources, and dispositions influence his or her perception of groups' entitativity and homogeneity. A second set of presentations considered the social perceiver in social contexts, situated as a group member in a social structure. The focus here was on how group membership relates to the perception of group homogeneity and entitativity. These contributions addressed both intragroup and intergroup factors. Moreover, group membership was examined both as a cause and a consequence of group perceptions. A third set of presentations examined ideological and cultural factors that affect group perception. The central idea here was that the individual perceiver is not only located in particular groups within a given social structure, but is also part of a larger cultural and ideological context. Not surprisingly, these large-scale contexts may affect the naive theories people entertain about social groups and, thereby, influence group perception.

It was on purpose that we set the small group meeting right before the Oxford EAESP general meeting. The attractiveness of this major scientific event, combined to the interest of group perception issues among social psychologists, allowed us to gather an unusually large number of colleagues from Europe, the United States, and Australia. Participants included the following colleagues: M. Brauer, M. Brewer , R. Brito, D. Crano, R. Cabecinhas, A.-M. de la Haye, K. Ehrenberg, K. Fielding, G. Fischer, A. Guinote, D. Hamilton, N. Haslam, M. Hewstone, M. Hogg, Y. Kashima, B. Keijzer, K.-Ch. Klauer, M. Kofta, Y.-T. Lee, S. Levy, J.-Ph. Leyens, P. Linville, F. Lorenzi-Cioldi, R. McConnell, C. McGarty, R. Moreland, J. Plaks, K. Reynolds, A. Rodriguez, R. Rodriguez Torres, C. Ryan, G. Sedek, J. Sherman, R. Spears, S. Stroessner, S. Watt. A number of colleagues, i.e. graduate students, post-docs and professors, from our research unit attended the meeting and very much contributed to make

this all possible: G. Buidin, E. Castano, C. Comblain, C. Dalla Valle, S. Demoulin, M. Desert, M. Dumont, C. Estrada, G. Gonçalves, G. Herman, P. Paladino, V. Provost, S. Rocher, A. Rogier, N. Scaillet, J. Vaes, J. Vermeulen.

At the end of the meeting, most participants of the meeting joined the many Louvain-la-Neuve members of the Association on a collective Eurostar trip heading for Oxford. For those of us who were still capable to think about scientific issues after this rather intensive three-day workshop, the Eurostar travel offered a unique opportunity for planning follow-up studies or evaluating theoretical models. Most of us however chose to take some rest or to chat with their friends and colleagues as the sights under the Channel turned out to be a bit less exciting than those depicted in Jules Verne's novels.

Reports of Previous Meetings

CORRECTION
Members' Meeting in Oxford
Oxford, July 1999

In the report of the Executive Committee by Jacques-Philippe Leyens there was a mistake in the last issue of the Bulletin (vol. 11, 3, p. 16). He reported on 13 small group meetings, but only 9 appeared in Figure 2. The missing small group meetings have taken place in Belgium, France, Germany, and Slovakia. Here is the corrected version of Figure 2:

Small Group Meetings   *Medium-Size Metings*

3 Italy   2 Germany
2 Netherlands
2 Poland   *Summer School*
2 United Kingdom
1 Belgium
1 France
1 Germany   1 Belgium
1 Slovakia

Figure 2
Conferences sponsored by EAESP

Grants

In the *European Bulletin, 1998, vol. 10, 3, pp. 14-17* the Executive
Committee announced a new initiative: "Early Career Development
Awards for members of the Association". These take three forms: (1)
Postgraduate Travel Bursary; (2) Postdoctoral "Seedcorn" Research Grants;
and (3) Assistance with the preparation of manuscripts for publication
(Translation grants). Those members who have received a grant may
publish a brief report in the *EBSP*. For further information see the *ProFile,
1999, pp. 41-44.*

GRANTS AWARDED

Dr. Inna Bovina (seedcorn grant)
Dr. Philip Brömer (seedcorn grant)
Anja Eller (travel grant)
Boukje Keizer (travel grant)
Dr. Flora Kokkinaki (seedcorn grant)

GRANT REPORTS

Dr. Inna Bovina, Moscow State University, Russia

It was nice to get out of the plane and to realise that the cold winter
weather together with the snow had stayed in Moscow. Actually the
matter of my visit was other than a week vacation at the 3rd part of the
semester. I have been awarded the EAESP seedcorn grant to visit the
Laboratory of Social Psychology (Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale,
U.F.R.Sciences de l'Homme et de la Societe - Universite Pierre Mendes
France, Grenoble-2) and I have got an excellent chance to get the
theoretical and methodological advice before starting the research.

I should say that I have talked to my chief and scientific adviser before the
departure so I have got consulted. While in the laboratory I was a bit

confused, however. On the one hand, I felt like a Cinderella, because my scientific adviser Prof. Andreeva has recommended to work a lot: to correct the project, to get some recently published articles (unfortunately, it is not enough recently published articles in the libraries here in Moscow), to get know more about scientific interests of the people from the laboratory, to learn about the educational program at the Department of Psychology etc. Then I could go to the museums if I still had time…

My chief Prof. Dontsov has recommended doing my best to complete my individual program of the visit, but he also stressed that I should visit the museums. It wouldn't be possible to say afterwards that I visited Grenoble having not seen Stendal's places. Everyone who visits Grenoble goes to Stendal's places…

I should say that the classes in my department at Moscow State University start at 9:20. OK, regarding the 2 hours time shift between Moscow and Grenoble I could easily adjust to it and to meet my scientific adviser Fabrizio Butera next morning at 8:00. Our discussions were really productive and let me correct the project as well as to work out the questionnaire itself. I was close even to start the research and Dominique Muller - one of the Fabrizio's PhD students, was searching for the subjects in the nightclubs and some other places, because I needed the certain groups (drug addicts and homosexuals) for the research.

Well, of course, it was short of time to carry out the research during just few days but I got ready for it and the plans for the future collaboration were defined.

I meet very interesting and nice people there. I was able to discuss not only my project about Social Representations of Aids, but also different psychological topics. Having the privilege of the foreigner to ask question "Why?" a bit more often than the adults usually do I have learned new facts about the current experimental studies, about the way students get psychological education in psychology at the Department, about perception of risk, social influence etc...

Aside from scientific reality I have also learned about "Beaujolais nouvelle" that arrived in France the days I was there…

People from the laboratory - Prof. F. Butera, Prof. E. Depret, Prof. O. Desrichard, Dr. L. Begue, PhD students Celine Buchs, Marie Depuiset, Kais Hellali, David Michelon, Dominique Muller, Jean-Pierre Vernet, were very helpful and caring. Apart from the scientific discussions and organisation of the appointments with other professors of the Department Fabrizio also "booked the snow for me", so I would not feel homesick while I stayed there, as he has said when it started to snow on the third day of my staying in Grenoble…

On the back way I have got an excellent chance to analyse the results of the visit while I was waiting for 6,5 hours for the connection at the airport. Well, the individual scientific program was completed, the questionnaire was prepared and the future plans were also agreed.
I would like to thank Prof. F. Butera, Prof. E. Depret, Prof. O. Desrichard, Dr. L. Begue, PhD students Celine Buchs, Marie Depuiset, Kais Hellali, David Michelon, Dominique Muller, Jean-Pierre Vernet and secretary Annie Genovese for help and co-operation.

Dr. Philip Brömer, University of Tübingen, Germany
Ambivalence in Close Relationships

Ambivalence in close relationships is conceived as simultaneously reflecting positive and negative sentiments towards the relationship. Drawing upon interdependence theory and the investment model, the bases of dependence (i.e., satisfaction level, investment size, and quality of alternatives) should produce feelings of ambivalence if they have opposed implications for the relationship (e.g., a low level of satisfaction but high investment size).

A cross-sectional study and two experiments showed that ambivalence operates independently of commitment in adult romantic involvements. In particular, ambivalence was associated with reduced perceived oneness, reduced willingness to accommodate, enhanced avoidance motivation, and stronger intentions to break up the relationship.

Announcements

1ST INTERNATIONAL POSTGRADUATE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY CONGRESS
8th - 11th February 2000 at the UAB campus at Bellaterra (Barcelona, Spain).

The purpose of the meeting is to share current work being done by postgraduate social psychology researchers world-wide. The congress will be a focus for research students currently working on their PhD or Master's projects. It will also lay the foundations for an international network promoting discussions of postgraduate work in progress.

The meeting is organised by the *Social Psychology PhD Programme at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain*.

PARTICIPANTS: We very much welcome interest from postgraduate students working in any area of social psychology and related areas.

HOW TO PARTICIPATE: We invite submission of papers, posters and symposium proposals. We also welcome those interested in attending the conference as part of the audience.

SUBMISSIONS: <u>Papers</u>: papers should be of 20 minutes length. Please submit us a summary of not more than 250 words.
<u>Posters:</u> Posters should be no larger than 1.5 metres by 1 metre. Please submit us a summary of not more than 250 words.
<u>Symposia</u>: A symposium should involve between 4 and 6 participants developing a given research theme. One of these should be the co-ordinator, who will be responsible for the symposium arrangements.
To encourage interdisciplinarity and co-operation, the symposium must involve participants from at least three different universities. The submission must come from the co-ordinator and must include a summary of 250 words about the symposium theme, and separate 250 words summaries of each paper.

DEADLINES
   * 30 September 1999, for proposals of papers, posters and symposia
   * 31 October 1999, acceptance will be communicated
   * 31 December 1999, definitive schedule with the dates of the lectures

PRICES
Prices will be as follows:
   * 100 Euros for registration before 31 December 1999
   * 130 Euros for registration after 31 December 1999

Contact: Lupicinio Íñiguez (Email: international.congress@cc.uab.es)
Updated information on the submissions, programme, and travel details
may be found at: http://cc.uab.es/~ilpse

**Note: EAESP Postgraduate Members participating at this congress can
apply for a travel grant.** Please contact the Administrative Secretary Sibylle
Classen: clasen@uni-muenster.de
Information about application for grants can be found on the EAESP-web
site (available from February 2000 onwards) http://www.eaesp.org and in
the *ProFile, 1999, pp. 41-44*

EAESP-SPSSI INTERNATIONAL SMALL GROUP MEETINGS

The European Association of Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP) and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) are pleased to announce their decision to co-sponsor International Small Group Meetings. The purpose of this collaboration is to help strengthen links between the two organisations and provide opportunities for their members to discuss research questions that are of mutual interest. In the first year of the scheme both organisations will act as 'host sponsor' of one meeting. One meeting will be held in Europe and the other in North America. For each meeting, the host sponsor will contribute $3500 and the guest sponsor will contribute $1500 for each meeting. Therefore, the total contribution of both organisations is a limit of $5000.

The themes of meetings should generally be social issues related, and these issues should be relevant internationally (i.e. not focused purely on intra-national questions).

For each meeting there must be two organisers, ideally one should be a member of SPSSI and one should be a member of EAESP. Preferably one organiser should be based in Europe, the other in North America. In their application the organisers should describe the structure of their proposed meeting. In general, however, the meeting will include 20-30 participants. Approximately 20 of the participants will present at the meeting, with about half invited to speak and the other half submitting related abstracts of their research. Typically, the funds provided for the meeting can be used either to contribute towards travel costs or to cover accommodation and meals (for all or just some participants). Within the number of conference participants, the ratio of participants from the hose and guest organisations should be as close to 1:1 as possible, and should not exceed 2:1.

Application details are available from the EAESP administrative secretary, Sibylle Classen (clasen@uni-muenster.de), and also the EAESP web site (www.eaesp.org) or from SPSSI Central Office (spssi@spssi.org) or the SPSSI web site (www.spssi.org).

Proposals must be received by September or March for meetings to be held at least 9 months later. This allows time for the meetings to be publicised in EAESP and SPSSI bulletins and newsletters.

EAESP publishes all abstracts and meeting reports in the EAESP Bulletin. In addition, conference organisers will be encouraged to submit articles associated with the conference for consideration as an issue of the *Journal of Social Issues* or to one of SPSSI's other publication outlets.

EAESP-SPSP International Teaching Fellowship Scheme

The European Association of Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP) and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) are pleased to announce their decision to co-sponsor a series of International Teaching Fellowships. The scheme supports one-week expert-led graduate schools in Europe and North America. Applications are now welcome.

The aims of this scheme are: a) to foster international cooperation between members of these two organisations; b) to provide an opportunity for groups of graduate students to receive intensive specialist education from an academic expert from overseas; c) to provide an opportunity to build links between groups of researchers and research institutions within a geographical region.

The scheme will operate on a trial basis for the first two years. Two Fellowships will be awarded each year, one to be hosted in Europe, the other in North America.

The scheme operates as follows. A host institution (e.g. a university psychology department in North America) arranges an invitation to a distinguished scholar from overseas (e.g. somewhere in Europe) to provide one week of instruction and supervision for a group of graduate students. The host institution, together with other participating departments must cover all the costs of accommodation, meals and entertainment.
In addition to providing official backing (e.g. the title of the Fellowship) and coordination for this scheme, EAESP and SPSP provide financial and

material support. Each Fellow will receive a stipend from EAESP and SPSP amounting to $2000. This may be used to cover travel or other expenses including those of companions.

The host institution need only have a few graduate students who participate, but must arrange that students from other neighbouring institutions also participate for the full week. At least one, and preferably 2 or more other institutions should send graduate students to participate. The total number of students should be between 8 and 16. The organisation of the week's activities is flexible but should ensure that as many graduate students as possible are able to gain from a mixture of large and small-group or one-to-one interaction with the Fellow. The week should include social as well as academic activity, and should include ways of ensuring that links and communications among the participants are set up on a longer term basis.

Procedure for Applications

One Fellowship will be awarded to an institution in Europe and the other to an institution in North America. The host institution organiser must be a member of EAESP or SPSP, respectively. The Fellow visiting North America must be a member of EAESP and the Fellow visiting Europe must be a member of SPSP.

The host organiser should prepare a 2 page application that provides an explanation of how the expertise offered by the Fellow will provide education in an aspect or area that is not normally covered by faculty already working among the host-site group of departments. The application should describe how many students will participate, and from which departments or institutions. In addition there should be a summary of the type of social and extra-curricular activities that will be arranged around the Fellow's visit (e.g. the visit could be attached to the end or start of a conference, there could be other academic events linked to the visit, and there might be a trip to a regional tourist attraction, museum, exhibition, or other event), and what steps will be taken to ensure that the network of participating graduate students is sustained after the conclusion of the Fellow's visit. The application must include a copy the

proposed Fellow's vita, and of a letter from the proposed Fellow stating that, if the Fellowship is granted, he or she will accept the invitation.

Priority will be given to proposals that best meet the criteria of bringing international social psychological expertise to a wider group of graduate students. Applications from institutions that have limited resources or access to such expertise will receive higher priority.

The application should be submitted by email to the EAESP administrative secretary, Sibylle Classen (clasen@uni-muenster.de). Applications are considered jointly by representatives of the Executive Committee of EAESP and SPSP. Proposals must be for meetings to be held at least 6 months later. This allows time for the meetings to be publicised in EAESP and SPSP bulletins and newsletters and to ensure that participation is as full as possible. Deadlines for applications are March 15th and September 15th.

After the Fellowship, the host organiser must provide a brief report summarising the week's activities and the list of participants, for publication in the EAESP Bulletin and the SPSP Dialogue.

NEXT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

The next Executive Committee Meeting will take place in Amsterdam on May, 13th-14th , 2000. Please make sure that all contributions to the EC (applications for meetings, applications for membership, etc.) are received by the Administrative Secretary by **April, 10th, 2000** latest.

News about Members

NEW ADDRESS

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fax: +44-1895-203018
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NEW MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION

The following applications for membership were approved by the Executive Committee at its meeting in October, 1999. If the Secretary does not receive objections from any member within one month of publication of this issue of the Bulletin, these persons will become members of the Association in the grades indicated. Names of members providing letters of support are in parentheses:

Full membership

Dr. Antonio AIELLO
University of Rome, Italy
(M. Bonnes, E. de Grada)

Dr. Richard CRISP
University of Birmingham, UK
(M. Hewstone, R. Martin)

Dr. Manfred Max BERGMAN
University of Cambridge, UK
(C. Fraser, G. Duveen)

Dr. Rudolf FORSTHOFER
University of Eichstätt, Germany
(B. Simon, R. Mielke)

Dr. Heribert FREUDENTHALER
University of Graz, Austria
(G. Mikula, A. Mummendey)

Mª del Carmen GÓMEZ
BERROCAL
University of Granada, Spain
(J.F. Morales, M.S. Navas Luque)

Dr. Esther LÓPEZ-ZAFRA
University of Jaén, Portugal
(J.F. Morales, M. López-Sáez)

Dr. Paula NIEDENTHAL
University of Clermont-Ferrand,
France
(J.-P. Leyens, L. Garcia-Marques)

Dr. Paschal SHEERAN
University of Sheffield, UK
(M. Conner, C. Armitage)

Dr. Richard SHEPHERD
University of Surrey, UK
(G. Breakwell, P. Sparks)

Dr. Colette VAN LAAR
University of Leiden, The
Netherlands
(N. Ellemers, H.A.M. Wilke)

Dr. Chiara VOLPATO
University of Trieste, Italy
(A. Maass, D. Capozza)

Dr. Eva WALTHER
University of Heidelberg,
Germany
(H. Bless, K. Fiedler)

Affiliate membership

Dr. Stephanie GOODWIN
Boston College, MA, USA
(N. Macrae, V. Yzerbyt)

Dr. Jeffrey W. SHERMAN
Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL, USA
(G. Semin, P.A.M. van Lange)

Dr. Bernd WITTENBRINK
University of Chicago, IL, USA
(V. Yzerbyt, M. Diehl)

Dr. Michele WITTIG
California State University, CA,
USA
(D. Abrams, G. Mikula)

Postgraduate membership

Susanna CORSINI
University of Louvain-la-Neuve
(B. Rimé, J.-P. Leyens)

Katja EHRENBERG
University of Bonn, Germany
(T. Meiser, K.C. Klauer)

Benoît MONIN
Princeton University, NJ, USA
(D. Hilton, J.-C. Croizet)

Janina PIETRZAK
Columbia University, NY, USA
(M. Lewicka, M. Jarymowicz)

Dirk SMEESTERS
University of Leuven, Belgium
(N. Vanbeselaere, E. van
Avermaet)

Rossana STANGA
University of Milano, Italy
(S. Reicher, F. Sani)

Mahena STIEF
University of Erlangen, Germany
(A. Abele-Brehm, G. Gendolla)

Lesley STOREY
London, UK
(X. Chryssochoou, C. Fife-Shaw)

Pepijn VAN EMPELEN
University of Maastricht, The
Netherlands
(R.M. Mertens, G. Kok)

RESIGNATIONS

Dr. Urs Fuhrer, Magdeburg, Germany

Heidi J.W. Janssen, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Dr. Ibolya Vari-Szilagyi, Budapest, Hungary

Executive Committee

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Administrative Secretary:
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web site of the EAESP (available from February 2000 onwards):
http://www.eaesp.org